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The Prevailing Culture Over Immigration: 
Centralized Immigration and Policies Between 
Attrition and Accommodation 
Antonios Kouroutakis* 
In 2012, the Supreme Court delivered a decision in Arizona v. 
United States that attracted the interested of the press because it 
challenged a controversial immigration law which several states 
copied.  Although faced with an opportunity to speak about 
immigration policy reform, the Court ruled on preemption issues 
instead.  The case is still important, however, because the prevailing 
culture surrounding immigration is enshrined within its content.  This 
article argues that there is a twofold divide in the legal culture 
surrounding immigration.  The Court’s decision explicitly confirms the 
“centralization” trend, which is the need for central decision making 
instead of allowing for state-specific polices.  Alternatively, this case 
implicitly confirms the rise of a new dipole in immigration policies 
between attrition through enforcement and accommodation through 
massive or limited amnesty.  At first glance, this case seems to have 
limited precedential value; however, it encapsulates the present status 
quo of immigration policies in the United States and the dipole in the 
political debate between attrition and accommodation, and it embodies 
the immigration acquis. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 23, 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed what is 
arguably the most controversial immigration law in the history of the 
United States.  Introduced as Arizona Senate Bill 1070,1 the “Support 
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” was amended by 
House Bill 2162,2 and is commonly known as S.B. 1070 legislation 
(S.B. 1070).  It was perceived by the press as the most stringent and 
toughest law to address illegal immigration.3  In fact, this remark has 
more value if we take into consideration that more than 160 laws on 
immigration have been enacted since 2010. 
One thing that S.B. 1070 created was two criminal offenses, 
making it a crime for someone with illegal immigration status to be 
present in the state of Arizona4 or to seek employment there.5  S.B. 
1070 also granted broad authority to state and local officers, who have 
traditionally enforced federal immigration law together with federal 
officials.6  Pursuant to S.B. 1070, officials can question individuals 
about their immigration status based on a reasonable suspicion that they 
                                                                                                             
 1 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 2 H.B.  2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 3 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html.  For more 
details, see Ian Gordon & Tanseem Raja, 164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? 
A MoJo Analysis’Analysis, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database. 
 4 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1509 (2016). 
 5 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-2928(C) (2016). 
 6 See, e.g., Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999); Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 
468 (9th Cir. 1983) (regarding the dual role of state and local officials in the administration 
of immigration law together with their federal counterparts). 
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might be undocumented immigrants.7  Additionally, officials can arrest 
anyone without a warrant if the arrestee committed a public offense that 
makes them removable.8  Understandably, these provisions raised 
substantial constitutionality issues relating to racial profiling. 
Arizona legislators were vocal about S.B. 1070’s purpose.  The 
bill’s preamble before the Senate states: 
the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement 
the public policy of all state and local government agencies 
in Arizona.  The provisions of this act are intended to work 
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and 
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons 
unlawfully present in the United States.9 
Even before the scheduled day for the promulgation of S.B. 1070, 
opponents began challenging the law’s constitutionality.10  The 
Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of Arizona in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on July 6, 2010, claiming 
that S.B. 1070 was unconstitutional because federal immigration law 
preempted S.B. 1070, and that S.B. 1070 violated the Supremacy 
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States.11 
It was not long before the Supreme Court heard the case.12  After 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, twenty amici curiae were 
submitted in support of Arizona, while twenty-one amici curiae were 
submitted in support of the federal government, and one neutral brief 
was submitted.13  A study of these third-party documents demonstrates 
the centrality that the amici placed on human rights concerns.  
Specifically, the amici argued that S.B. 1070 triggered Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection violations.  For example, the 
Rutherford Institute urged “the Court [to] be mindful of an even greater 
                                                                                                             
 7 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-1051(B) (2016). 
 8 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-3883(A)(5) (2016). 
 9 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1 (Ariz. 2010). 
 10 See Ann Morse, Arizona’s Immigration Enforcement Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last updated July 28, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/analysis-of-arizonas-immigration-law.aspx; Catherine Han Montoya & 
Ron Bigler, The Aftermath of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, (last visited Sept. 20, 2016), 
http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/the-aftermath-of-arizonas.html. 
 11 Complaint at 1, 68, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) 
(No. 10-1413), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2010/07/06/az-
complaint.pdf. 
 12 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 13 Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
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concern: that the bill is preempted by our nation’s Bill of Rights.”14  
This gave the Supreme Court a chance to consider the compatibility of 
attrition policies within the human rights framework.  In its decision, 
the Court side-stepped the civil rights issues because the government’s 
own submissions did not claim a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Interestingly, plaintiffs 
eventually conceded to this during the oral procedure when the Chief 
Justice raised the issue.15 
The legal dispute in the Arizona case focused on whether Arizona, 
as a state sovereign, has the power to implement immigration policies.  
The Court applied traditional preemption principles previously 
articulated in case law.16  Some scholars argue that, in actuality, the 
Court did not actually settle the constitutional preemption question in 
the immigration sphere.17  However, a between-the-lines reading and 
an examination of the case from more than a legal perspective 
highlights that the real question before the Court was whether and to 
what extent policies deterring unauthorized immigration are acceptable 
under the current concept of the states’ powers over immigration. 
The case was decided by a 5-3 majority.18  Justice Kagan recused 
herself because the case was originally filed during her time serving as 
Solicitor General in President Obama’s cabinet.19  The Court found 
three provisions (Sections 3, 5(C), and 6) of S.B. 1070 
unconstitutional.20  Specifically, Sections 3 and 5(C), introduced the 
abovementioned criminal offenses21 and Section 6 authorized 
warrantless arrests.22  The Court upheld Section 2(B), which authorizes 
police officers to inquire into immigrant documentation status.23  The 
Court decided the case based on the preemption doctrine, finding that 
the federal government, and not the states, are competent to regulate 
immigration policy.24  Thus, the Arizona case added another brick on 
                                                                                                             
 14 Brief of Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 15 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/11-182.pdf. 
 16 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01. 
 17 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: 
A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013). 
 18 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497. 
 19 Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 20 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 21 Id. at 2497–98. 
 22 Id. at 2498. 
 23 Id. at 2510. 
 24 Id. 
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the “preemption legal framework” in the immigration arena, a topic 
known as “immigration federalism.” 
Besides its value regarding substantive preemption jurisprudence, 
the decision is equally important for what the Court did not say.  S.B. 
1070 criminalized the status of undocumented immigrants in an 
attempt to deter unauthorized immigrants from coming to, and 
remaining in, the state.  The proposed law straddled the line between 
immigration law and criminal law, a concept known as 
crimmigration.25  The public debate about illegal immigration has 
shifted from the past dichotomy between deportation and massive 
amnesty, to a new dipole between attrition through enforcement and 
accommodation.26 
A careful reading of the decision provides us with the paramount 
conclusion about the legal culture over immigration policies.  
Immigration policy is a daunting task because of its complicated nature 
and its national and international implications.  Subnational interests 
and peripheral governments often place the practical burden of 
implementation on state and local authorities.  Immigration flow into 
specific “host states” significantly impacts that host state.  Since 
immigration dynamics vary across time and across states, the Court’s 
decision confirms the need for a more holistic approach to the 
immigration problem.  There has been a shift from federalist 
immigration to centralized immigration, where the federal government 
frames the policy, and states implement and enforce those policies, 
while also adjusting those policies when necessary. 
The article proceeds as follows; Part A will analyze the issues 
presented in the Arizona case and discuss various institutional concerns 
raised by the Court pertaining to which legislative body is better suited 
to regulate in this area.  Part B will explore various arguments for and 
against centralized immigration to demonstrate the divergent 
viewpoints and differences between local and national approaches.  
This part will highlight the shift from the federalist immigration to 
centralized immigration.  Part C will turn its focus to the legal 
framework of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., and particularly 
the immigration problem of Arizona.  The analysis in this part explains 
the impetus behind Arizona’s enactment of such restrictive legislation 
and presents the concerns of the federal government and the position 
of the Court.  Further, it will argue that these policies apparently aim to 
                                                                                                             
 25 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U.L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
 26 Kris W. Kobach, Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2008). 
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limit the number of undocumented immigrants, to discourage new 
undocumented immigrants to enter the country and to encourage those 
already there to depart.  Finally, this part will conclude with discussing 
the new dipole in the immigration political debate, which on the one 
hand there is the aim of attrition, and on the other hand there is the aim 
of policy to accommodate undocumented immigrants by creating paths 
for lawful immigration status with constitutional protections. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASE: LEGAL ISSUES 
A. The Case: Issues and Procedural History 
The United States filed suit against the State of Arizona claiming 
that Sections 2(B), 3, 5, and 6 of S.B. 1070 were unconstitutional.27  
The federal government argued that Congress’s pervasive immigration 
legislation preempted any state legislative action.28  In its defense, 
Arizona responded that the Act does not violate the Supremacy Clause, 
and that the enforcement of the Act functions within the scope of the 
federal immigration law.29 
Section 3 made the failure to comply with federal alien 
registration a state misdemeanor,30 while Section 5(C) made it a 
misdemeanor for an unlawful alien to seek or engage in work in the 
state.31  Interestingly, both of these already constituted civil violations 
under existing federal law.32  The question presented to the Court 
regarding these provisions was whether Arizona could impose its own 
penalties for an otherwise illegal act.33  Section 6 authorizes police 
officers to make a warrantless arrest of a person if the officer has 
probable cause to believe that this person has “committed any public 
offense that makes the person removable from the United States.”34  
Section 2(B), also known as the “status check provision,” requires 
police officers to verify immigration status when they conduct a stop, 
detention, or arrest.35 
                                                                                                             
 27 Complaint at 1, 68, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) 
(No. 10-1413), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2010/07/06/az-
complaint.pdf. 
 28 Id. at 1. 
 29 Brief for Petitioners at 28, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-
182). 
 30 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1509 (2016). 
 31 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-2928(C) (2016). 
 32 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2016). 
 33 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). 
 34 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-3883(A)(5) (2016). 
 35 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-1051(B) (2016). 
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On July 28, 2010, a district court issued a preliminary injunction 
preventing these four provisions of S.B. 1070 from taking effect.36  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, acknowledging the 
likelihood of the federal government’s success on its preemption 
argument.37 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Kennedy delivered the 5-3 majority opinion of the Court, 
while Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito filed opinions concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.  The specific issue before the Court was 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause’s preemption principles, federal 
law permits the four provisions of S.B. 1070 in dispute.38  The majority 
found that the provisions criminalizing otherwise civil violations, 
Sections 3 and 5, and the warrantless arrest provision, Section 6, were 
unconstitutional.39  The Court, however, upheld the constitutionality of 
the status check provision, Section 2(B), allowing local authorities to 
inquire into an immigrant’s status.40 
The Court examined the case thematically.  It isolated the 
provisions in dispute, presented the main arguments of each side, and 
evaluated existing legal framework, legislation, and case law to 
determine the constitutionality of the provisions.  The Court reiterated 
that the “plenary power doctrine,” the federal government’s well-
established authority to regulate immigration matters, is based both in 
the Constitution and on case law.41  Indeed, Henderson v. Mayor of 
New York first established the federal government’s broad immigration 
power 1875.42  In Henderson, the Court expressed the need for a 
uniform immigration policy, noting that “[t]he laws which govern the 
right to land passengers in the United States from other countries ought 
to be the same in New York, Boston, New Orleans, and San 
Francisco.”43 
After the Supreme Court in Arizona explained the plenary power 
vested in the federal government to regulate immigration, the Court 
described Congress’s pervasive presence in the immigration arena.  It 
noted, for example, that Congress has criminalized unlawful entry and 
                                                                                                             
 36 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010), overruled by 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492. 
 37 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 38 Id. at 2497. 
 39 Id. at 2510. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 2498. 
 42 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875). 
 43 Id. at 273. 
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reentry and authorized states to deny public benefits to immigrants.44  
The Court then explained that local immigration officials are granted 
wide discretion to implement immigration policy and states can address 
their unique immigration issues, provided their actions do not violate 
federal preemption.45 
III.  CENTRALIZED IMMIGRATION POLICIES: COM-
IMMIGRATION 
A. The Antithetical Approaches on Immigration Law-Making and the 
“Golden Ratio” 
The Supreme Court has long-since established that the federal 
government is vested with the power of law-making regarding 
immigration.46  What remains a murky immigration policy question, 
unguided by the Constitution or case law, is where to find the correct 
balance between federal power and that of the states. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) codifies most federal 
immigration official authority and confers substantial enforcement 
authority to state officials.47  The Supreme Court has previously held 
that states may lawfully adopt regulations complementary to federal 
immigration laws in a context not already regulated by the INA.48  
Hence, the balance of competence between the federal government and 
the states revolves around the golden ratio within the normative 
concept of federal immigration, which implies a partnership between 
federal and state government.49 
The Court ultimately held that three provisions of S.B. 1070 
unconstitutionally disturbed that balance, but each for different 
reasons.  Section 3 was incompatible with federal law regarding 
penalties.50  Section 5(C) was inconsistent with the clear intent of 
Congress to abstain from the imposition of criminal sanctions against 
undocumented immigrants seeking work.51  Section 6’s warrantless 
                                                                                                             
 44 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 45 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01. 
 46 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Henderson v. Mayor 
of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). 
 47 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.). 
 48 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2014). 
 49 Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement 
and State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1821 
(2011). 
 50 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012). 
 51 Id. at 2505. 
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arrest created an obstacle to the cooperation between federal and state 
officers.52 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stressed that “[t]he 
National Government has significant power to regulate immigration.  
With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national 
power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its 
responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching, 
thoughtful, rational civic discourse.”53  Similarly, regarding the federal 
government’s unique stake in immigration policy, Justice Kennedy 
stated: 
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces 
immediate human concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to 
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger 
than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.  
The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, 
including whether the alien has children born in the United 
States, long ties to the community, or a record of 
distinguished military service.  Some discretionary decisions 
involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s 
international relations.  Returning an alien to his own country 
may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed 
a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for 
admission.  The foreign state may be mired in civil war, 
complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions 
that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be 
harmed upon return.  The dynamic nature of relations with 
other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that 
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s 
foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.54 
The Court also acknowledged the role of the States in immigration 
policy, noting that “[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation does not 
diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States.”55  
Explicitly referring to Arizona, the Court evidenced the unauthorized 
immigration issue and acknowledged that the problem is real and 
extensive, and that “[s]tatistics alone do not capture the full extent of 
Arizona’s concerns.  Accounts in the record suggest there is an 
‘epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and 
                                                                                                             
 52 Id. at 2507. 
 53 Id. at 2510. 
 54 Id. at 2499. 
 55 Id. at 2500. 
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environmental problems’ associated with the influx of illegal migration 
across private land near the Mexican border.”56 
It is estimated that 11.9 million undocumented immigrants live in 
the United States, who constitute 4 percent of the nation’s population 
and 5.4 percent of the workforce population.57  In 2009, undocumented 
immigrants were estimated to compose 5.8 percent of Arizona’s 
population and 7.5 percent of its labor force.58  The very same year in 
Maricopa Countythe most populous area of the State of Arizona, 
encompassing over half of the state’s residentsit was reported that 
unlawful aliens were responsible for more than 10 percent of serious 
crimes (i.e. felonies).59  In addition, according to the analysis of data 
from the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program in 2004, illegal 
immigrants compose 11.1 percent of Arizona’s prison population.60  
These statistics highlight the degree to which the presence of illegal 
immigrants has sufficiently burdened Arizona. 
The Court further clarified the golden ratio by finding the status 
check provision, Section 2(B), constitutional.61  The Court held that 
states are not precluded from regulating complementary to the federal 
enforcement scheme, so long as they do not undermine federal law.62  
It rejected the federal government’s concern that the status verification 
provision was unconstitutional because it is mandatory and provides 
for the possibility of prolonged detention.63  Unlike the other provisions 
of S.B. 1070 that the Court found to be unconstitutional, the status 
check provision found the appropriate constitutional ratio of 
cooperation between federal and state governments. 
The Court’s ruling determines the golden ratio in federal 
immigration, both positively and negatively.  Positively, federal law 
shall leave room for the state to regulate.  Negatively, a state provision 
                                                                                                             
 56 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. 
 57 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the 
United States, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2009/04/14/a-portrait-of-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/. 
 58 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down 
Sharply Since Mid-Decade, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/09/01/us-unauthorized-immigration-flows-are-down-
sharply-since-mid-decade/. 
 59 Steven A. Camarota & Jessica Vaughan, Immigration and Crime: Assessing a 
Conflicted Issue, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Nov. 2009), http://cis.org/Immigrant
Crime. 
 60 Id., tbl.6. 
 61 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 2509. 
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may not contradict federal law, be incompatible with Congress’s intent, 
nor create obstacles to the application of the federal law. 
B. The Case for Centralized Immigration 
The Court’s opinion, which advocates for the centralization of 
immigration laws by the federal government, represents a relatively 
new outlook regarding immigration policymaking.  The House of 
Representatives attempted to revive the pre-Arizona v. United States 
philosophy empowering the state’s ability to enact their own 
immigration law, when it passed the SAFE Act.  This was ab initio 
ineffective since it did not pass in the Senate, and Congress cannot 
overturn the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation.64  This 
signifies a priority shift towards national concerns by approaching the 
immigration problem holistically.  The question of the centralization, 
however, remains an ongoing debate. 
Governor Brewer, along with many in her corner, argued that the 
federal government failed to sufficiently block the flow of illegal 
immigrants into the United States.  States sharing a border with 
Mexico65 are particularly affected by the flow of undocumented 
migrant workers and have a vested interest in immigration policy, as 
they carry a “disproportionate share of the cost of illegal 
immigration.”66  The recent surge of the undocumented population in 
the United States, even though nowadays is stabilized, intensifies the 
need for immigration policy reform.  Over the last two decades, a 
notable increase in the number of undocumented immigrants has been 
observed all over the United States.67  With this backdrop, the Court 
defined the parameters of the partnership between federal and state 
government in immigration policy. 
Although each state, region, and county suffers from unique 
immigration problems, a successful immigration policy must take a 
broad approach unrestricted from the interests of the local society.68  
Some practical concerns highlight the need for holistic immigration 
policies as well.  As the Court noted, the federal government is 
                                                                                                             
 64 Josefina Aguila, Note, The Federal Immigration Power: Why Congress Cannot 
Overturn the Court’s Decision in Arizona v. United States, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 663, 664 
(2014). 
 65 Arizona itself shares a 370-mile border with Mexico.  Brief for Petitioners at 1, 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Passel & Cohn, supra note 57. 
 68 See Aguila, supra note 64, at 674 (discussing the implications of placing 
immigration policy within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government). 
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uniquely situated to regulate immigration policies and has a special 
interest in immigration policy irrelevant to the individual states.69 
Arizona was not alone in its quest for immigration policy reform.  
Shortly after Arizona enacted S.B. 1070, similar bills were introduced 
in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Michigan 
and Illinois.70  The Court’s centralized vision of immigration policy 
effectively blocked this multiplier effect.  On a positive note, individual 
states no longer have the authority to implement a policy which would 
be unduly burdensome on another state.  For example, a strict 
immigration policy from one state will likely reroute the flow of 
immigration to a neighboring state.  The drawback of a centralized 
immigration policy, however, is that it disregards the interests of 
individual state, especially those suffering from illegal immigration 
problems.  The adoption of S.B. 1070 threatened to burden neighboring 
states and spawned mass protests in and around the United States.  
Interestingly, Mexico submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
Federal Government.71 
Unfortunately, the balance found by the Court is not the ultimate 
answer to the ongoing immigration problem.  Deadlocks in Congress 
prevents it from keeping up with the times, and politician’s concern for 
the motives of constituent voters causes such restrictionist legislation 
at the state level.  What the Arizona decision shows is that the golden 
ratio of federal immigration is not absolute, and that a state role in 
immigration policy should not be overshadowed by the federal 
government’s newfound competence.  Hence, there is a shift from what 
is known as “federal immigration” to “com-immigration,” where states 
are restrained in implementing federal legislation, but retain a decisive 
role on minor immigration issues. 
IV.  POLICIES BETWEEN ATTRITION AND 
ACCOMMODATION 
Undoubtedly, the severity of the immigration problem poses new 
challenges.  Legislators are constantly seeking new ways to enforce 
existing federal law and to implement original immigration policies.  
Arizona argued that it met this challenge by enacting S.B. 1070.  
Specifically, Arizona argued that Section 3 criminalized the failure to 
                                                                                                             
 69 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 70 Ann Morse, Arizona’s Immigration Enforcement Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (last updated July 28, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/analysis-of-arizonas-immigration-law.aspx. 
 71 Amicus Curiae Brief of the United Mexican States in Support of Respondent, 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
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complete or carry an alien registration document, which sufficiently 
paralleled already existing federal law requiring immigrants to register 
with the government.72  Alternatively, the United States argued that 
Section 3 created an unconstitutional Arizona-specific “supplement” to 
the nationwide immigration scheme, because it criminalized an act on 
which Congress chose only to impose civil liability.73  In support of the 
government, the Court cited prior precedent that Congress’s 
immigration policy is “a single integrated and all-embracing system,” 
which does not allow the states to complement federal law by enforcing 
auxiliary regulations.74  The Court further distinguished Sections 3 and 
5, explaining that while Section 3 criminalized the failure to register as 
an alien, which already carried civil liability under federal law, Section 
5 criminalized the application, solicitation, or performance of work in 
the state of Arizona.75 
History has shown that civil sanctions are not a sufficient deterrent 
to prevent undocumented immigrants from entering the United States.  
Nor do civil sanctions encourage “self-deportation,” which is the 
voluntary return of undocumented immigrants to their home country.  
Criminal sanctions are a viable option to combat the immigration 
problem, provided the federal government enacts them.  Enacted on a 
state level, however, crimmigration affects the immigration policy of 
neighboring states and violates the expressed intent of the federal 
government.  In fact, the Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1070 with 
the intention of discouraging the presence of undocumented 
immigrants in Arizona.76  The question of where those discouraged 
immigrants should go is easily answeredneighboring states. 
Some scholars suggest that crimmigration does not answer the 
immigration problem.  What would, however, is a combination of 
strictly enforced immigration laws.  Others suggest the harsh adoption 
of policies regarding the detention, apprehension, removal, and grant 
of public assistance to undocumented immigrants.77  One scholar goes 
so far as to wonder whether we should “encourage self-deportation by 
making life in the United States as difficult as possible for 
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undocumented immigrants, through such means as barring access to 
elementary, secondary, or tertiary education, or denying drivers’ 
licenses, credit cards, identification cards, bank accounts, and even 
housing[.]”78 
Some have taken issue with the idea of allowing police officers to 
demand documentation because by encouraging racial profiling, it 
violates civil rights.79  Others contend that such laws are considered 
cruel, racist, and counterproductive because language, accent, and skin 
color would be the “suspicious” element law enforcement officers 
would use before inquiring about the immigration status of an 
individual.80  These issues received international attention when the 
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights issued a press release 
“express[ing] its deep concern with the high risk of racial 
discrimination in the implementation of the law” and “with the 
criminalization of the presence of undocumented persons.”81  The 
Court, however, was not concerned with immigration policies and 
human rights; nor did it express any hesitation about the criminalization 
of immigration law.  Commenting on the case, one scholar remarked 
that: 
Many of these laws [recent state enactments on immigration] 
were pushed by anti-immigration groups who expected a 
friendly embrace by the Roberts Court. What they found 
instead was that a solid majority of the court—the decision 
was 5–3, with Justice Elena Kagan recused—believes that 
only the federal government is authorized to make life 
miserable for undocumented aliens.82 
The above statement accurately maps the second legal outcome of 
the case.  The three unconstitutional provisions did not substantively 
bother the Court, and instead it merely held that federal legislation 
preempted the provisions.  The Court implied that a Congressional 
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crimmigration statute would be within the federal government’s 
constitutional powers.  In doing so, the Court kept the door open for 
Congress to enact legislation similar to Arizona’s preempted 
provisions.  Interestingly so, per the Court, a state cannot complement 
existing civil penalties with a criminal dimension, but the federal 
government can.83  What the Arizona case implicitly describes is a 
current model of immigration policy centering on self-deportation and 
prevention of undocumented immigrants through (substantively 
constitutional) draconian legislation. 
Conversely, some legislation and other Supreme Court cases 
indicate a different approach entirely, known as the “accommodation 
model.”  The Supreme Court has long recognized an accommodation 
legal framework, finding undocumented immigrants have a right to full 
criminal procedural safeguards,84 public education for their children,85 
and the right to know deportation consequences of a guilty plea by their 
lawyer.86  In addition, the Court has explicitly stated that the 
apprehension, detention, and removal of these immigrants necessarily 
implicates the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human 
beings.87 
A new policy, known as the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), exemplifying 
the accommodation model was recently adopted.  Arguably a 
separation of powers violation, DAPA granted a special deferred status 
to undocumented immigrants who are parents of either a U.S. citizen 
or an undocumented immigrant under certain conditions.88 
The United States immigration debate centers around two 
antithetical policies.  Some laws are adopted to discourage new, 
undocumented immigrants from entering, and to encourage those 
currently residing in the country to voluntarily depart.  Other legislation 
aims for attrition, by providing a path for lawful immigration status. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although Arizona state legislators claimed that their policies 
embodied in S.B. 1070 merely enforced existing federal immigration 
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legislation to combat the large number of aliens unlawfully residing in 
Arizona, their draconian legislation actually sought to prevent the 
presence of undocumented immigrants in Arizona.  Critics feared that 
the tough measures in the law, together with broad discretion granted 
to law enforcement officers in identifying and apprehending illegal 
immigrants, encouraged racial profiling.  The Court, however, was 
concerned that S.B. 1070 broke those boundaries constitutionally 
reserved for the federal government.  The Court concluded that the 
Constitution entrusted the federal government with immigration 
policymaking. 
Despite having an excellent opportunity to set the boundaries of 
substantive immigration policy, the case is primarily about preemption; 
yet, the case does have a significant impact on the prevailing legal 
culture over immigration in the United States.  It highlights the shift in 
immigration policymaking from the local and regional dimension to a 
broad regime.  The dynamic partnership between the federal and state 
governments has had its past terms amended, and the pendulum has 
swung closer towards the federal government.  What remains to be seen 
is whether the federal government will exploit this power to combat the 
immigration problem. 
Given that the Court has hinted that the federal government may 
adopt legislation like the preempted provisions of S.B. 1070, the 
political debate has spun off in two divergent and antithetical 
approaches.  Attrition remains a viable option, implementing highly 
restrictive laws, and alternatively, accommodation is a valid path, 
providing an opportunity for lawful immigration status.  Therefore, the 
Court’s decision has limited value as a legal precedent.  Instead, it 
encapsulates the trend for more holistic immigration policies and the 
dipole in the political debate between attrition and accommodation.  
The decision embodies the immigration acquis. 
